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The turbulence in credit and funding markets in the second half of 2007 is disturbing evidence that risk 
dispersion in ﬁ  nancial markets has been less effective than expected. Investors appear to have acquired 
risks that they did not understand. Much more worrisome, however, is the evidence that major ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms did not succeed in shedding risks so much as in transferring them among their own business lines, 
resulting in an unintended concentration of risks on their own balance sheets. In order to restore conﬁ  dence 
in the near term, and to put credit creation on a more sustainable path in the future, supervisory authorities, 
central banks and governments will ﬁ  rst need to understand why the much-vaunted dispersion of risk fell 
so far short of expectations.
The “reluctance to lend” which underlies these strains in money markets was widely attributed to concerns 
about the ﬁ  nancial condition of borrowers, as a consequence of uncertainty about the value of assets 
on the borrowers’ balance sheets, and also to insufﬁ  cient attention to liquidity management by ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms. But the focus on uncertainty about borrowers ignores the awkward fact that the major ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries are both lenders and borrowers themselves and their reluctance to lend signiﬁ  cantly reﬂ  ects 
a defensive reaction to their own uncertainties about their own balance sheets.
Better stress testing for liquidity as well as solvency would certainly be beneﬁ  cial. Yet a major cause of 
the strains in credit and funding markets has been the apparent inability of many ﬁ  rms to anticipate the 
interaction of their various on- and off-balance sheet exposures and, particularly, to understand the velocity 
of their off-balance sheet activities and how these affected their overall exposures.
In considering potential remedies to the credit market’s turbulence and to the apparent failure of risk dispersion, 
the authorities should ﬁ  rst reﬂ  ect on their own role in the trend of pushing risks off of bank balance sheets.ARTICLES
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T
he turbulence in credit and funding markets 
since the summer of 2007 is disturbing 
evidence that risk dispersion in ﬁ  nancial 
markets has been less effective than expected. 
Investors appear to have acquired risks that 
they did not understand. Much more worrisome, 
however, is the evidence that major ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms did not succeed in shedding risks so much 
as in transferring them among their own business 
lines, resulting in an unintended concentration 
of risks on their own balance sheets. In order to 
restore conﬁ  dence in the near term, and to put 
credit creation on a more sustainable path in the 
future, supervisory authorities, central banks and 
governments will ﬁ  rst need to understand why the 
much-vaunted dispersion of risk fell so far short 
of expectations.
While the general features of the credit cycle 
are recognizable in the events leading up to 
August of 2007, the sudden and persistent premium 
in short-term Dollar, Sterling and Euro inter-bank 
interest rates has been both a puzzle and a potential 
threat to the provision of credit to otherwise 
ﬁ   nancially-healthy households and businesses. 
The “reluctance to lend” which underlies these 
strains in money markets was widely attributed to 
concerns about the ﬁ  nancial condition of borrowers, 
as a consequence of uncertainty about the value 
of assets on the borrowers’ balance sheets, and also 
to insufﬁ  cient attention to liquidity management by 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. These are undoubtedly contributing 
causes of the elevated funding costs.
But the focus on uncertainty about borrowers 
ignores the awkward fact that the major ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries are both lenders and borrowers 
themselves and their reluctance to lend signiﬁ  cantly 
reﬂ  ects a defensive reaction to their own uncertainties 
about their own balance sheets. Many have focused 
on shortcomings in liquidity management, and it is 
a common critique that too much attention has been 
paid by regulators and others to solvency risks at the 
expense of liquidity risk. This may be true but too 
narrowly deﬁ  nes the problem.
Better stress testing for liquidity as well as for solvency 
would certainly be beneﬁ  cial. Yet a major cause
of the strains in credit and funding markets 
has been the apparent inability of many ﬁ  rms 
to anticipate the interaction of their various
on- and off-balance sheet exposures and, particularly, 
to understand the velocity of their off-balance sheet 
activities and how these affected their overall 
exposures. At the same time, the major ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries face the additional uncertainty of 
more complex accounting rules which might require 
more off-balance sheet exposures to be consolidated 
onto their balance sheets.
In considering potential remedies to the turbulence 
of 2007 and to the apparent failure of risk dispersion, 
the authorities should ﬁ  rst reﬂ  ect on their own role 
in the trend of pushing risks off of bank balance 
sheets. Then, before considering changes to the 
permissive off-balance sheet regime that has evolved, 
they should weigh carefully the risks of a too-rapid 
de-leveraging and the possibility of a further, 
pro-cyclical contraction of credit.
1| THE CREDIT CYCLE
The general features of the credit cycle are easily 
recognized in the events leading up to and during 
this summer’s turbulence. Accommodative monetary 
policy, intended to stimulate aggregate demand, has 
its most pronounced effects on the most interest-rate
sensitive sectors of the economy. When the central 
bank withdraws the accommodation, raising real 
rates both dampens new activity and decays ﬁ  nancial 
asset values. Higher rates and a ﬂ  atter yield curve 
cause lenders’ margins to narrow, increasing the risk 
of credit defaults and reducing demand for loans all 
at the same time.
In this cycle, global monetary conditions in general 
and United States monetary conditions in particular 
were extremely accommodative from 2002 to 
2004. Following the events of 9/11, the recession 
of 2001 and the corporate scandals of 2002 and 
2003, the Federal Reserve provided an extended 
period of monetary accommodation with negative 
two-year real interest rates for much of 2003 and 2004
(see Chart 1). This stimulated the most interest-rate 
sensitive sectors of the US economy: housing and 
leveraged investing.ARTICLES
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Global markets, following the stock market declines 
earlier in the decade, had demonstrated a marked 
preference for ﬁ  xed-income investments –reﬂ  ected 
in ever-tighter credit spreads and relatively low and 
stable equity price-earnings ratios (see Chart 2).
By creating an abundance of credit, monetary 
policy correspondingly created a scarcity of yield in 
global capital markets. Subprime mortgages to less
credit-worthy residential homeowners represented a 
“perfect” intersection of supply (given the stimulated 
housing investment) and demand (from investors 
searching for yield) (see Chart 3).
This constellation of conditions –low real rates, 
rapid housing investment and demand for 
mortgages, and investor demand for ﬁ  xed-income 
yield– provided an extraordinary stimulus both for 
leveraged corporate buyouts and the securitization 
and packaging of credit investment products. 
Nominal global issuance of credit instruments is 
estimated to have experienced a twelve-fold increase 
from USD 250 billion in 2000 to USD 3 trillion 
in 2006, representing the sum of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) –which are, 
themselves, levered investments in mortgages and 
high-yield corporate debt (see Charts 4 and 5).
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The disintermediation of traditional balance sheet 
lending, through the securitization of credit and its 
transfer to investors through traded capital markets, 
has been going on since the 1980s. But the expansion 
of the securitization process in this decade has 
accelerated the transformation of the ﬁ  nancial 
services industry from one of banks, brokers and 
insurance companies into one that reﬂ  ects a division 
of labor among asset originators, asset distributors, 
and asset managers. This division of labor, and the 
growth of capital markets activity which it reﬂ  ects, 
necessarily relies upon funding and trading positions 
in money and credit markets in order to move assets 
along the chain of agents.
2| THE SUMMER OF 2007
The abrupt reversal of the credit market conditions 
in the summer of 2007 followed a sudden shift in 
monetary policy expectations and real rates that took 
place in the spring. At the start of 2007, most market 
participants anticipated a relatively benign path
of monetary conditions from central banks. The 
Federal Reserve had stopped tightening policy 
in 2006 and was expected to begin easing policy 
toward the end of 2007; the Bank of England was also 
expected to be easing policy later in the year; and the 
European Central Bank was expected to be ﬁ  rming 
policy but only on a very gradual trajectory.
By May, however, the Federal Reserve showed no 
signs of easing in the near-term, and futures prices 
took out any expectations for rate cuts later in the 
year, which lead to an increase in real rates as 
reﬂ  ected in inﬂ  ation-indexed Treasury securities. 
With poor inﬂ  ation readings, the Bank of England 
began raising rates and the ECB was raising rates 
more deliberately than the market had originally 
anticipated. This ﬁ  rming in policy expectations and 
the associated rise in real rates led to a decline in 
the prices of credit instruments, particularly for 
securities associated with subprime mortgages.
In response to the decay in prices and the simultaneous 
rise in volatility, a number of major ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms 
began to reduce their credit exposures to hedge 
funds, provided through their prime brokerage arms. 
While this may have been a prudent counterparty 
credit decision, it had the seemingly-unanticipated 
consequence of reducing demand for the very 
mortgage-backed securities and structured credit 
instruments that were being underwritten, packaged 
and sold to hedge funds and other investors by the 
major ﬁ  rms’ mortgage-origination and investment 
banking businesses. Falling prices for these riskier, 
higher-yielding instruments had the predictable 
consequence of weakening demand which, in turn, 
caused a backup of inventories in asset-origination 
pipelines. This occurred most noticeably for
subprime mortgage originators like Countrywide
and for the investment banks that had commitments 
for private-equity ﬁ   nancings which they had 
expected to repackage and sell to investors.
A wide variety of investment funds and structured 
vehicles set up to invest in credit instruments with 
short-term borrowing came under pressure. Major 
ﬁ   rms were not immune; in June, Bear  Stearns 
confronted large losses in two hedge funds it 
had sponsored and, then, in early August, BNP 
announced that it would freeze three investment 
funds that it had sponsored. While these two ﬁ  rms 
garnered the most publicity during this period, 
there were a number of other investment 
vehicles, including CDOs, structured investment 
vehicles  (SIVs) and bank conduits, which had 
entered the same maturity mismatch, funding with 
short-term asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
and investing in credit instruments which came 
under pressure at the same time.
Shortly following the BNP announcement, a classic 
“ﬂ  ight to quality” began as those investors who had 
been ﬁ  nancing the ABCP market sought to sell their 
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ABCP exposures and switch to safer investments, such 
as short-term government bills, causing an abrupt rise 
in yields on ABCP and a fall in yields on government 
paper. As investors expressed an unwillingness to roll 
over the ABCP exposures, the volume of ABCP being 
issued began a precipitous decline. Those in need 
of short-term funding scrambled to ﬁ  nd alternatives 
and borrowing costs began to rise sharply in the 
short-term Euro inter-bank market as well as in 
the London inter-bank market for both Sterling
and US Dollars (see Charts 6 and 7).
While there were initial differences in their responses 
(most notably by the Bank of England), the ECB, 
the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve all 
eventually responded with the offer of larger than 
normal injections of reserves. The Federal Reserve 
has lowered both its Discount Rate and the Federal 
Funds Rate to reduce short-term borrowing costs. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, spreads between 
both short-term government securities and central 
bank policy rates, on the one hand, and short-term
inter-bank borrowing costs on the other, have 
remained at wide levels while a lack of liquidity has 
pervaded both traded credit markets and secured 
and unsecured funding markets.
3| TOO MANY, RATHER THAN
  TOO FEW, EXPLANATIONS
In attempting to understand the causes of the current 
credit and liquidity “crunch”, as well as potential 
remedies, we have a problem of too many rather 
than too few explanations.
Some have focused on the easy monetary conditions 
that preceded this episode and insist that only time 
and ﬁ  rm monetary policy are needed to purge the 
system of the excesses. Others point to the myriad 
complex agency problems in the securitization 
markets ranging from the loose lending standards 
by asset originators who lack sufﬁ  cient incentive 
to police credit quality to excessive instrument 
complexity and failures of disclosure by asset 
packagers and distributors, compounded by a failure 
of the rating agencies to be sufﬁ  ciently tough on 
the asset originators and distributors. Another line 
of analysis has focused on the apparent failure
of bank liquidity risk management and concluded 
that both banks and bank regulators have given too 
much attention to solvency risk, particularly in work 
on bank capital requirements, and too little attention 
to liquidity risk.
Much of the initial attention by central banks and 
the authorities focused on the LIBOR and EURIBOR 
inter-bank lending markets and was premised on 
the belief that the market was “broken” and needed 
to be “ﬁ   xed.” This approach is problematic on 
two levels.
First, the very concept of a uniform inter-bank 
borrowing rate is a function of good times, and  tends 
to come under pressure when the cycle turns. In the 
1970s the short-term liabilities of the clearinghouse 
banks in the United States traded at the same levels 
but this consistency fell apart in the turbulence of 
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all beneﬁ  ted from identically-priced liabilities in 
the late 1980s only to see this fall apart under the 
pressure of the post-bubble “lost decade” of the 
1990s. If credit risk was being so poorly priced in the 
earlier years of this decade, maybe the inter-bank
lending market was actually broken when so many 
had the beneﬁ  t of identical and low borrowing costs 
and maybe the market is now in the process of being 
ﬁ  xed by a greater attention to credit risks.
Second, elevated inter-bank borrowing costs should 
not be thought of as the disease itself but, rather, 
as the symptom. The initial rise in borrowing 
spreads was ascribed to uncertainty about asset 
values causing concern about the credit quality
of borrowers, leading lenders to both raise rates and 
cut back on the quantities they were willing to extend. 
Given this credit premium, adding excess central 
bank reserves and lowering rates, by adding to the 
supply of liquidity, would presumably encourage 
lenders to make short-term credit available to 
borrowers. There is much to this line of analysis 
but it is critically incomplete.
Potential lenders were certainly concerned about the 
borrowers’ credit quality and this was particularly 
evident in the withdrawal of support from the ABCP 
market. But the sudden rise in inter-bank borrowing 
costs, and the continued scarcity of short-term secured 
and unsecured funding, is much more a reﬂ  ection
of lenders’ anxieties about their own asset quality and 
their own balance sheets. The rapid and synchronized 
back up in borrowing costs in Dollar, Sterling,
and Euro inter-bank markets strongly suggests 
a linkage across the balance sheets of the major 
lenders, who operate in all three markets. Thus, 
even initially, the strains in money markets should 
be understood as signiﬁ  cantly reﬂ  ecting a lenders’ 
strike by the major ﬁ  nancial intermediaries –who 
are themselves borrowers, lenders and investors in 
the very same credit instruments.
4| THE FAILURE
  OF RISK DISPERSION
Taking a step back, it seems clear that risk dispersion 
did not work as expected. The continued evolution 
of securitization and derivative instruments should, 
in principle, provide for a more efﬁ  cient allocation 
of risks to those who both can and want to hold 
them, providing for a more efﬁ  cient allocation of 
capital in the economy and for ﬁ  nancial stability 
through diversiﬁ   cation. The practice of 2007, 
however, has been a disappointment. Indeed, given 
the widespread observation that risk in general, 
and credit risk in particular, was being mis-priced 
in recent years, how could market mechanisms 
be expected to achieve an efﬁ  cient allocation of 
these risks?
Why did the outcomes fall so far short of the 
promise? There are two possibilities: ﬁ  rst, investors 
did not understand the risks that they bought and, 
second, the intermediaries did not know which risks 
they had shed, retained or reacquired. A failure by 
investors to understand the risks that they acquired 
can have two possible causes: agency problems
of misaligned interests and failures of disclosure, on 
the one hand, and excessive exuberance (or perhaps 
conscious avoidance) on the part of investors, on the 
other. A failure by intermediaries to understand the
portfolio of risks that they retained or acquired 
through their various business lines would 
reﬂ   ect fundamental risk-management errors in 
understanding the interactions and correlations
of their on- and off-balance sheet exposures.
The correct answer is: “all of the above.” But we 
should be much more surprised and worried by the 
risk-management failure of the intermediaries, who 
are the engines of the risk-dispersion process, than 
by the presence of agency problems and exuberant 
investors. It is of course desirable for investors to 
understand the investment risks that they acquire 
but if the institutions that stand at the center of the 
risk dispersion process do not understand what they 
are doing, the trouble runs much deeper.
The role of agency problems. The increasingly-reﬁ  ned 
division of labor in securitization markets does create 
greater opportunities for a misalignment of interests 
and for agency problems to occur.
Asset originators, who are at the point of contact 
with borrowers, but who are expecting to pool and 
ofﬂ  oad individual loans, have a diminished incentive 
to assure the initial credit quality of the individual 
borrower and to monitor the borrowers’ ongoing 
credit standing during the life of the loan. In some 
asset-backed markets, the original lender retains a 
residual exposure and/or has ongoing liabilities in ARTICLES
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servicing the loan and ensuring ongoing compliance 
with credit guidelines. But in other markets,
and with respect to some structured vehicles, this 
is not the case.
Asset packagers and distributors have incentives 
to understate the risks and overstate the rewards
of investment products they sell. At the same time, 
the current cycle and the quest for yield seem to have 
encouraged products of tremendous complexity. 
While most markets have extensive disclosure 
requirements for investment products, accurate and 
useful disclosures have to be continuously revised 
to keep up with instrument innovation.
The rating agencies also appear to have contributed 
to investors’ under-estimation of the risks in 
many of the more complex investment structures.
The long-recognized agency problem inherent in the 
rating agency business model of being paid by issuers 
(rather than investors) are even more problematic in 
the case of complex structured vehicles as contrasted 
with the securities of a traditional corporate issuer.   
Corporate issuers are governed by executives and 
boards who are accountable for the business entity’s 
ongoing performance and cash ﬂ  ows that underlie 
the securities they issue. Structured credit vehicles, 
on the other hand, stand on their own, almost like 
ﬁ  nancial drones which, once launched, just keep 
going under their initial terms and conditions. 
At the same time, the division of interests of structured 
credit vehicles is highly complex and requires 
extensive modeling to analyze. As a consequence, 
investors are likely to rely even more heavily on
third-party ratings to assess the risks of structured 
credit instruments. During the recent rapid 
expansion of structured credit issuance, the rating 
agencies encouraged investor acceptance by 
assigning their highest ratings to structured pools 
composed of much lower quality assets, effectively 
diluting the quality of their service –their “brand”–
to an extraordinary extent.
The efﬁ  ciency of risk dispersion would undoubtedly 
be improved if the interests of investors were 
better aligned with the agents that populate our 
capital markets. Credit underwriters in the asset 
origination process need incentives to adhere to 
lending standards and to continue to monitor credit 
quality. Retention of elements of risks shared with 
the ultimate investors, or contractual liabilities to 
maintain credit standards are effective in a number 
of asset-backed markets and could be adopted in 
others. Securities regulators can and should consider 
improvements in disclosure requirements that 
might highlight the risks associated with structured 
credit instruments.
Securities regulators should also consider a thorough 
reform of the rating agency process. Shifting the 
alignment of the rating agencies’ incentives from 
those of issuers to investors would improve the 
efﬁ   ciency of capital markets (but would likely 
be strongly resisted by the agencies because it is 
so much easier to collect rents from issuers than 
from investors). For example, the rating agencies 
could shift to a publishing model in which ratings 
themselves would be made public but the analytic 
reports behind the ratings would have to be paid for 
by investors. (More radical changes in the structure 
of the accounting and stock analyst industries were 
engineered earlier in this decade). A greater number 
of ratings per investment issue, more intellectual 
capital and more competition would all be desirable 
objectives of reform as well.
The role of investor behavior. All of these agency 
problems are quite real and deserve further attention. 
Yet, when considering an investment transaction 
between an institutional buyer and an institutional 
seller, the most effective means of ensuring that 
investors understand the risk they incur is to make 
investors responsible for those risks by adherence to the 
principle of caveat emptor –buyer beware.
Other than in cases of fraud (or material 
misrepresentation), how can anyone other than 
the institutional investor be responsible for 
understanding the risks they incur? Indeed, the 
premise that both economic efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  nancial 
stability will be served by the dispersion of risks to 
those both willing and able to bear them rests on 
the assumption that risk appetites and risk tolerance 
will be idiosyncratic to particular investors.
Investors are under no compulsion to buy 
any particular investment. Given information 
asymmetries in the retail markets, an investor 
protection approach to regulate relations between 
institutional sellers and individual buyers makes a 
great deal of sense. But among institutional buyers 
and sellers, any information asymmetry between 
them can be resolved by the prospective buyer 
demanding more information, investing in their ARTICLES
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own information and analytic capabilities or, ﬁ  nally, 
by declining to make the purchase.
Subprime mortgages are made to borrowers with 
lower credit ratings or who are taking on larger loans 
than would otherwise be deemed creditworthy.
Alt-A mortgages –known as “liars’ loans”– are 
made to borrowers who have not completed all
of the normal credit checks and lending documents. 
What additional disclosures or information would 
an investor require to be informed that securities 
backed by pools of these mortgages might carry 
greater risks and be subject to higher rates of default 
than those of other mortgages?
When investors are offered instruments with 
higher returns than those prevailing on similar 
instruments, it should be understood that they 
carry with them higher risks as well and that the 
higher return speaks for itself –res ipsa locutor– in 
delivering a higher level of risk. If institutional 
investors are not prepared to take the time and the 
expense to analyze and understand the risks they 
incur, they will have to bear the expense of losses 
beyond their expectations.
It is worth noting that a number of major,
supposedly-sophisticated banks were victims of 
the same asset-valuation optimism that infected 
other investors, as evidenced by the signiﬁ  cant
balance-sheet mark downs of subprime and CDO 
exposures that many have experienced in 2007. 
Reversing the over-valuation of assets is how losses 
in ﬁ  nancial markets can exceed the losses from 
defaults on the underlying cash ﬂ  ows: marking down 
an asset value whose price reﬂ  ected either too low a 
probability of default or too optimistic an expectation 
for its purchase in the secondary market can cause 
losses to the holder of the asset even though the 
underlying borrower is still in good standing.
The role of the risk distributors. When we reﬂ  ect on the 
failure of risk dispersion, we should be much more 
troubled by the idea that the major ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms 
–the very institutions at the center of the process
of risk dispersion through securitization and 
derivative markets– do not appear to have understood 
the portfolio of exposures that they had either 
retained or acquired.
At its most basic level this reﬂ  ects a profound
risk-management failure on the part of leading banks 
to understand the portfolio of on- and off-balance 
sheet exposures they were running and, especially, 
how the velocity of their off-balance activities would 
affect their on-balance sheet exposures “when 
the music stopped.” Accounting rules intended to 
reduce the potential for off-balance sheet abuses, 
such as those that occurred at Enron, have added an 
additional layer of complexity to the banks’ ability to 
determine what is on- and off-balance sheet.
There may have been a failure of many ﬁ  rms to 
appreciate the liquidity risks that they were incurring 
and a trend of taking for granted both their ability 
to fund and their ability to adjust positions in traded 
markets. Greater attention to liquidity risk might 
have somewhat reduced the market strains but 
would have been an incomplete answer to the risk 
management failures that contributed to this episode. 
Their fundamental failure was in not understanding 
how different lines of business would interact. Put 
differently, a precondition for designing an effective 
stress test is a through understanding of the constituent 
exposures thrown off by each business.
Consider the following sequence of a bank in 
multiple lines of business. Real rates and volatility 
rise, leading the bank to reduce the credit it is 
extending to hedge funds against the collateral 
of subprime mortgages and CDOs (a reduction in
on-balance sheet assets). The subsequent decay in 
asset values (as other banks also reduce exposures 
to hedge funds at the same time) causes on-balance 
sheet losses to the same assets held for the bank’s 
own account and off-balance sheet losses in SIVs 
or conduits to which the bank has extented backup 
credit lines supporting their ABCP programs. 
When demand for ABCP declines, the bank loses 
underwriting fees (off-balance sheet income) and 
ﬁ  nds the vehicles calling on their backup line of 
credit (converting an off-balance sheet claim into 
an on-balance sheet asset). As demand for the 
underlying collateral falls, mortgages and leveraged 
loans that the bank was originating and expecting 
to sell on to investors start to accumulate either on 
the bank’s balance sheet or the bank’s own conduits, 
requiring funding at precisely the same time that the 
bank is confronted with demands for balance sheet 
space from clients.
In brief, while the bank is experiencing its own
on-balance sheet losses, which will eat into earnings, 
and possibly capital, it is confronted with the drying upARTICLES
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of off-balance sheet fee income and the conversion
of off-balance sheet exposures into on-balance 
sheet ones, resulting in further demands on 
the bank’s capital. What appears to have been 
lacking, underdeveloped, or receiving insufﬁ  cient 
management attention, was the ability to 
simultaneously stress test on- and off-balance sheet 
assets and liabilities, and to understand how the stress 
scenario would inﬂ  uence the volume of off-balance 
sheet fee-generating activities and the velocity
of off-balance sheet asset creation. A comprehensive 
view of a bank’s liquidity and solvency risks would 
be the product of such a stress test.
Anticipating the interaction of banks’ on- and 
off-balance sheet exposures has been made more 
complex by revisions to accounting rules. When the 
credit cycle turns, and losses mount, there are always 
difﬁ  cult conversations between bankers and their 
accountants about the recognition of losses and the 
consolidation of exposures onto balance sheets. But 
following the collapse of Enron and the other corporate 
scandals, both US and international accounting rules 
have been extensively revised to provide greater 
guidance on when and how off-balance sheet vehicles 
may be consolidated (FIN46(R), IAS 27 & SIC 12). In an 
effort to reduce the potential for abuse, these rules have 
been made more complex and their interpretation is 
contingent on changing circumstances.
The role of the authorities. Before governments 
and regulatory authorities consider reforms to 
address the turbulence of 2007 they should take a 
step back and reﬂ  ect that the quarter century of 
efforts to improve the safety and soundness of the 
banking system through the creation of risk-based 
capital rules has coincided with the progressive 
disintermediation of the banking system and a 
continuous movement of risks off of bank balance 
sheets. The evolving division of labor among asset 
originators, distributors and managers, the creation 
of mortgage-related and asset-backed securities, and 
the proliferation of stand-alone, risk-bearing vehicles 
–from hedge funds, to conduits, to SIVs and CDOs 
and CLOs– have all served the purpose of removing 
risks from bank balance sheets and, directly or 
indirectly, lowering the explicit bank capital needed 
to support these activities.
If the dispersion of risk away from a bank-centric 
credit process is both efﬁ  cient and effective it 
would, in principle, contribute to ﬁ  nancial and 
macro-economic stability. An efﬁ  cient process would 
be one that accurately prices and distributes risk 
to those more able and willing to hold those risks. 
An effective process would be one that diversiﬁ  ed 
those risks in an enduring manner away from the 
critical functions of credit creation. On the evidence 
of 2007, the system appears to have failed on both 
counts and, under stress, rolls both credit losses and 
funding pressures back onto the very balance sheets 
that supposedly had shed the risks. It may, however, 
still be too early to distinguish the excesses of the 
cycle from ﬂ  aws in the process.
Governments, central banks and regulatory 
authorities also face the more immediate task
of balancing the risks of being too permissive with 
respect to off-balance exposures against the risk of 
causing too-rapid a de-leveraging and the consequent 
credit contraction that this would imply. Financial 
institutions are now absorbing their on- and 
off-balance sheet losses and exposures and many are 
absorbing the additional demands of their clients who 
need to shed assets or for funding that can no longer 
be secured in commercial paper markets. If market 
participants come to expect that accounting, solvency 
or liquidity rules might soon be tightened in response 
to the events of 2007, the liquidity and credit crunch 
experienced so far might be only the beginning.